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Abstract
Revisiting Montreal professor Bill Readings’ posthumous critique of the modern university, this 
talk offers a new framework for understanding both the history of knowledge and changes in its 
institutions since the end of postmodernism.
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I. Introduction
 When Till asked me to propose a topic for this lecture, I Googled my mental archive for 
the keywords “Quebec” and “knowledge” and came up with Bill Readings’ book The University 
in Ruins. Readings was a professor of comparative literature here at  the Université de Montréal 
until his untimely death on Halloween Day  1994 in the crash of American Eagle flight 4184. The 
book that became The University in Ruins was completed on the basis of Readings’ unfinished 
manuscript by his wife and fellow literary critic Diane Elam and published posthumously  with 
Harvard University Press. It is a document of its times, a polemic about the fate of the university 
written at the highwater mark of postmodernism, critical theory, and Cultural Studies. Implicitly 
at least, it  offers a rejoinder from the Left to the diatribes of the Right against the evisceration of 
the canon of Western Civilization and the apparent abandonment of the humanistic pursuit of 
Truth. In his book, Readings reformulates what observers from all points on the political 
spectrum then perceived as the collapse of an intellectual tradition. He argues that the research 
university had ceased to act as a lodestar of national culture, the mission entrusted to it 200 years 
ago by  the German Idealists, in favor of pursuing an utterly  vacuous ideal of Excellence 
borrowed from the university’s new overlords in the corporate world. 
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 Part of what gives this slender volume its intellectual heft  is a deep engagement with the 
philosophical tradition reaching from the German Idealists through the French postmodernists 
and into the humanities departments of late twentieth-century  North America. In this sense it 
belongs to the genre of immanent Selbstkritik  (to resurrect a term I myself haven’t uttered since 
the Nineties.) Readings was particularly exercised by the work of Jean-François Lyotard, editing 
his collected political writings and penning a monograph on Lyotard’s contributions to aesthetics 
and political theory. But it is Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition that surfaces most frequently 
in Readings’ endnotes. Lyotard’s essay is such a canonical exemplar of abstruse French theory 
that one easily forgets it was actually commissioned as a humble “Report on Knowledge” by the 
government of Quebec, earning it second place on my mental Google list. In it, Lyotard 
memorably  and succinctly defined postmodernism as an “incredulity toward metanarratives,” a 
skepticism toward all-encompassing stories or grand traditions inherited from the Enlightenment 
about, say, the emancipation of the individual or the progress of reason. Building on Lyotard’s 
diagnosis, Readings argues that we are not simply witnessing the discrediting of one Grand 
Tradition, that of national culture, in favor of another, Excellence, but the end of Grand 
Traditions as such. This realization of the university’s incoherence causes him to label it  a 
fundamentally “ruined” institution and seek new ways to inhabit those ruins.
I first read The University in Ruins, and through it rediscovered Lyotard’s The 
Postmodern Condition, seven years ago at the beginning of a book project that itself originated 
as a cultural history  of the German Idealists’ research university, but that grew to encompass the 
entire Western intellectual tradition from Alexandria to the Internet. My recent book Reinventing 
Knowledge reconceptualizes that Grand Tradition as a series of institutions that have each 
redefined what knowledge means, how we should pursue it, and how we judge ourselves to have 
attained it. These institutions are, in chronological sequence, the library, the monastery, the 
university, the Republic of Letters, the disciplines, and the laboratory. Each arose at a moment of 
epochal cultural upheaval, each upheaval giving individuals and small communities of 
intellectuals remarkable creative latitude to pioneer new practices and rationales for seeking 
knowledge. Their “reinventions” of knowledge established durable, clonable institutional 
templates that not  only governed later generations of intellectuals, but also caused previously 
existing institutions to be revamped and reformed in their wake. Older institutions get recycled 
and refurbished, as, for example, the medieval monastery  absorbed the libraries of classical 
antiquity  and transformed them from instruments of Greco-Roman cultural imperialism into 
storehouses of devotional texts in the service of Christ. So too, I argue, perhaps surprisingly, that 
the university had already lost its centrality as an institution of knowledge some five centuries 
ago and has since acted as a repurposable shell subservient to its successor institutions as it was 
repeatedly reinvented by them.
 Like Readings and Lyotard, then, I have little use for grand narratives, preferring instead 
to depict the Western tradition as a succession of several radically discontinuous institutions, not 
a single unbroken lineage of ideas. But  unlike them, I feel that postmodernism posits a Grand 
Tradition in the very  act of denying its possibility. When Derrida, for example, rereads 
Heidegger on ancient Greek logos, even the most sophisticated outsider to Western philosophy 
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must largely fail to grasp  his point. My plea is that we adopt the perspective of just that  outsider 
in order to reassess the trajectories of institutions we ourselves inhabit. This leads me to my 
argument today. Where Readings discerns the rise of national culture 200 years ago and its 
demise in the university of today, I see during that same span of time the rise of the disciplines 
until their eventual replacement, institutionally, by the laboratory. To understand this 
transformation, which is ongoing in our own times and easily susceptible to misinterpretation, I 
submit we can take some bearings from Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition and will return to that 
text at the end of my talk.
II. Readings
 I want to begin by  laying out Readings’ account of the modern university, then provide an 
alternative history centered on the disciplines. Lest I appear churlish in critiquing an incomplete, 
posthumous work, least of all before an audience who may have some personal connection to its 
author, let me stress that Readings helped me to perceive the German research university both as 
a fundamental break from its medieval predecessor, but also as a durable template that, despite 
several waves of mid-level changes, gives the period from ca. 1800 to the late 1900s a certain 
unity.
 Conventionally enough, Readings ascribes an epochal importance to the founding of the 
University  of Berlin in 1810 by a Prussian state hobbled by Napoleon and eager to compensate, 
in spiritual terms, for what it had just lost  in material powers. Appropriately, he has nothing to 
say about the medieval universitas, instead regarding the research university as a radical new 
creation prepared by a generation of German Idealist philosophers.
 Among these, he singles out Immanuel Kant, whose Conflict of the Faculties articulated a 
vision of the university  with the untrammeled pursuit of Reason at its core, at  least in its faculty 
of arts, whose very uselessness gave it a better purchase on pure Philosophy than the higher, 
professional faculties for preachers, lawyers, and physicians, all mere practical occupations. To 
Kant’s defense of “Reason” Readings adds, in a separate chapter, an account of “Culture,” 
drawing here mainly  on Kant’s successors, Schiller, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, the last of whom helped found the University  of Berlin. The melding of 
Kantian Reason and Humboldtian Culture in the research university, Readings argues, served the 
interests of the German Nation, awakened to action by French defeat. The use of reason to 
analyze culture and reinterpet inherited cultural traditions gave rise to the sciences we variously 
label philological, historicist, or hermeneutic, and this bundle of scholarly methods could in turn 
be used to construct a national cultural unity where none existed before.
Consistently, Readings conflates “culture” with “national culture,” accurately perceiving 
that university reform in Germany coincided in time with an upsurge in nationalist sentiment, but 
failing to explain why the “nation” should act as the sole or privileged repository of “culture,” or 
even whether the German Idealists specifically identified German national culture as a value 
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worth institutionalizing in universities. Among those he mentions, only Fichte—admittedly the 
first Rector of the University of Berlin—clearly counts as a self-identified German cultural 
nationalist.
I’ll return later in my talk to the elision of “Culture” and “National Culture,” but for now 
I want to explain how the concept of National Culture enables Readings to trace the migration of 
the German research university model outside of Germany, particularly  to the higher education 
systems of Great Britain and the United States. In the Anglo-American university associated with 
Matthew Arnold and Cardinal Newman and their followers in North American liberal arts 
colleges and universites, German Philosophy was simply swapped out in favor of English 
Literature as the pedagogical foundation for the university’s mission and the source of the 
content of National Culture being inculcated there. Now Shakespeare and Dickens, not Plato and 
Kant, would form the basis for a national cultural canon. In this way  Readings can account for 
the ongoing influence of the German model without having to argue for the continuity of its 
specific ideology. One ideology  can supplant another in the pursuit of National Culture as long as 
the institution remains dedicated to some crowning ideal of the nation governing all of its 
subsidiary activities and giving the university coherence.
 With the rise of “Excellence,” however, we are in new territory according to Readings. 
By Excellence he means not a new ideology of national culture but a bundle of managerial and 
accounting techniques devoid of all substantive intellectual content and instead derived from 
corporate bureaucracies. Lacking any other means of discernment, university  administrators rely 
upon quantifiable metrics like student credit hours and faculty research grant funding to gauge 
the success or failure of the university’s administrative units. Excellence, unlike culture, lacks a 
referent, a substantive ideal like the “nation” to give intellectual pursuits in different forms—
literary, philosophical, artistic, scientific—their meaning.
Readings holds out no hope that academicians can simply  appropriate the concept of 
Excellence and imbue it with substantive content, just  as the followers of Humboldt arguably did 
with the similarly unformed notion of Bildung two hundred years ago. No classicist armed with 
the ancient Greek concept of arete can argue that  Excellence has been pursued for 2500 years, 
and that rereading the Iliad is the best way to acquire it.
In part the inherent vacuousness of the ideal of Excellence, to Readings, derives from its 
being the product of unstoppable forces extrinsic to the university and indeed threatening the 
nation-state itself. Using Marxisant appeals to the agency of capital, he ascribes a commanding, 
corrosive effect to the multinational corporation operating in a globalizing economy, and eroding 
the institutions of the nation-state including, preeminently, the university. Here too, Readings 
entertains no possibility that traditional university academics can parlay this situation to their 
advantage. One might logically conclude, for example, that economic globalization calls for a 
similar expansion of university pedagogy beyond the horizons of the nation-state to embrace 
some kind of global civics or international culture.
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The deeper reason this cannot occur, according to Readings, has less to do with Marx 
than with Lyotard, whose postmodern skepticism toward metanarratives denies the the possibility 
that any overarching ideal can be fashioned to govern and legitimate intellectual activity  under 
the aegis of the managerial university.
As Exhibit A he holds up interdisciplinary  programs in Cultural Studies, which are, after 
all, admirably catholic, cosmopolitan, and global in their vision of culture. Cultural Studies 
imbibes the theory  of postmodernism yet for that very reason is powerless to combat the 
emptying of Culture by the apostles of Excellence. Programs in this field treat culture itself as an 
object of technical analysis rather than as a commanding ideal, an ultimate source of value, 
ethics, and morality which our academic pursuits should aim to discover and elucidate. Cultural 
Studies in short manifests the ruining of previous ideals of national culture, whether pursued as 
philosophy in Germany or literature in the Anglo-American tradition, rather than acting to 
inculcate a new, postnational concept of culture we operate with in a globalized world.
Ultimately, Readings can only  counsel that we find ways to inhabit the ruins of the 
university. What he proposes here seems like a wise tactical concession of the humanistic 
disciplines’ obsolescence and perhaps even a genuinely exciting plea to turn these ruins into 
playgrounds of pedagogical experimentation. But in the end all he can do is register the death of 
one incarnation of the university without being able to perceive its recycling as the shell for its 
successor.
III. The disciplines
 In Reinventing Knowledge, I identify the disciplines, not the universities they  colonized, 
as the primary institutions of knowledge for the period after 1800. Like Readings, I accept the 
German Idealist model as the sign of a rupture, not from the medieval universitas, but from the 
institution that succeeded it, the Republic of Letters.
 The Republic of Letters arose during the European wars of religion as an international 
correspondence network keeping scholars in contact as the medieval universities devolved into 
ideological bootcamps for one or another rival religion. Growing from the handwritten letters of 
figures like Erasmus and Descartes, the Republic soon encompassed learned academies, museum 
collections—and above all—printed books and journals. By the eighteenth century, as 
universities declined into cesspools of pedantry and alcoholism, the media revolution of the 
Enlightenment created a mass market for knowledge engendering the specialization of academic 
labor we now call the disciplines. As Adam Smith put  it in the very first  book of The Wealth of 
Nations, the “subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every  other business, 
improves dexterity, and saves time.” So much for the notion that capitalists waited until the 
1980s to sink their hooks into knowledge.
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 But this is not in fact how the disciplines arose. Bucking the Enlightenment trend toward 
extensive reading, the promiscuous consumption of printed texts, the counterculture of 
evangelical Protestantism made Bible study groups the centerpiece of an ever more intensive 
practice of reading and scholarship. A string of largely unsung eighteenth-century reformers then 
refurbished the university as a site of face-to-face study one could not find in disembodied print 
media. Reinventing knowledge, they made seminaries—later called seminars—the seedbeds of 
disciplined research and disciplinary  specialization. This group included A.H. Francke, who 
instituted a Pietist seminary in Halle, Germany as part  of a massive complex of schools, 
orphanages, printing presses, a pharmacy, a linen factory, a cabinet of curiosities and—a 
university; J.D. Michaelis, the Göttingen university professor who introduced Pietist  Biblical 
criticism to secular scholars in the Republic of Letters; F.A. Wolf, who adapted Michaelis’ 
methods of Biblical philology to classical philology  in his famous seminar back at Halle; and 
Wolf’s disciple Wilhelm von Humboldt, the classical philologist who in Berlin founded a 
university where seminars sprang up  in a whole range of humanistic and later even scientific 
disciplines. Here, then, is one of those epochal moments when a small group of intellectuals 
engineered a surprising reversal in the accepted metanarrative of knowledge, bringing together 
disparate cultural resources in unprecedented recombinations as the raw materials of a new 
institution.
 This retelling of the story has a number of implications for how we assess Readings’ 
argument. First, the German Idealists came very  late to the scene, at best acting as ex post facto 
ideologues who merely  recognized and reinforced the coalescence of new practices of knowing 
burbling up around them. Substantively they completed the secularization of intensive reading 
begun with Michaelis’ break from Bible study. Their philosophy texts all but required seminar-
level training in close reading to be understood (Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, for example, is 
literally a course of annotated lecture notes). Ideologically, the Idealists linked the practice of 
scholarly research, Wissenschaft, to the acquisition of personal culture, Bildung, and by extension 
the good of society. But again, at no point did they fashion a specifically  national vision of 
culture and then proceed to institute it in a new university.
 This does not mean, however, that Readings’ argument about National Culture is wholly 
unfounded. Consistently  I treat ideology as a lagging indicator of daily  practice, and sure enough 
this applies to National Culture as well. Recall from Adam Smith that large markets are 
necessary  to promote the specialization of academic labor. That market was provided in 
Germany by the systems of compulsory mass education, beginning with primary school and 
crowned by reformed universities, erected in Prussia, Bavaria, and other states in the early 1800s. 
Competition induced the states of a still-disunited Germany to poach professors who freely 
roamed within the boundaries of the German linguistic region founding their own specialized 
seminars to train acolytes in new disciplines. These professorial pilgrimages helped define a 
common German culture through the higher education professors dispensed. The “nation” 
therefore acted not as the prior legitimator for, but simply the cultural vessel of, this market in 
tertiary  education, a market comprised of a series of far-flung national communities of specialists 
whose individual members inhabited particular universities as part of a larger career trajectory. 
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(Incidentally, these disciplinary networks retooled the print media of the Republic of Letters to 
make academic books and journals into a massive system of professional calling-card 
distribution.)
 Readings observes correctly  that  the disciplinary  university  eventually did come to rely 
ideologically  on the nation-state. The nation-state was the first to insist that culture be made the 
patrimony of all of its citizens and therefore to create markets in education at  all levels in pursuit 
of that mission. But the tension between the specialized research of the disciplines and the 
idealized vision of culture legitimating the university to its external patrons was present at the 
very inception of the institution, and did not emerge as the sign of a later twentieth-century 
breakdown. Disciplinary  scholars have struggled for 200 years to explain why their specialized 
research ineluctably  redounds to the benefit  of national citizenries. Ransacking their cultural 
archive, they typically  extol an ideal of civic, humanistic well-roundedness allegedly pursued 
since the time of the Greeks and the Romans. But this is merely  an atavistic legacy  of classical 
philologists like Humboldt who resurrected this ancient tradition just as their predecessors in the 
Renaissance had done at the inception of the Republic of Letters.
 The modern university is plagued, then, by a nagging incoherence, not because it ever 
had a well-articulated ideology from which it has progressively lapsed, but because its ideology 
and practice were at odds from the beginning. And this is as it  should be. Reconciling the 
interests of its members with those of the world beyond is what institutions of knowledge do, 
always imperfectly  and indeed always incoherently. Insiders’ struggles to legitimate themselves 
to outsiders define the life cycle of all institutions—just think of today’s banking institutions. 
And yet we are now witnessing something like the eclipse of the disciplines, and in the next 
section of my talk I want to sketch some of the signs of this before venturing some conjectures 
about the future.
IV. The laboratory
 I begin my chapter on the laboratory in Reinventing Knowledge with a familiar account of 
the way  the scientific experiments and demonstrations of the high Republic of Letters migrated 
into the disciplinary seminar structure of the research university. I define the laboratory  as a 
physical space where controlled experiments could be reliably  replicated and then held out as 
objective truth by scientific experts. Unconventionally, however, I extend my analysis of the 
laboratory as an institution in two further directions.
 First, my account encompasses both the natural and the social sciences. The age of 
industrialization, particularly in the United States, created entirely novel social spaces whose 
social scripts and rules of interaction were subject to study  and experimental manipulation by 
self-styled experts. Such spaces included the public school, a site where university psychologists 
developed large-scale intelligence testing as a means to track both over- and underachievers; the 
factory floor, where time-and-motion specialists and other species of management consultants 
conducted experiments to increase worker productivity; and immigrant slums, where large-scale 
foundations endowed by robber barons dispensed philanthropy on a scientific basis by informing 
themselves with foundation-funded social research.
 A second characteristic of the laboratory, implicit  already in the examples I’ve given, is 
that it bestrides the university and non-university worlds, colonizing the corporation and the state 
in particular. While drawing on disciplinary  methods and techniques, laboratory  practitioners are 
not in all instances confined by them. The spectacular successes of entrepreneurial startups in 
biotechnology  and computing, often founded in the shadow of nearby  universities, provide ready 
instances of this hybridity in the natural sciences. But so too the social sciences find lucrative 
market niches and broad societal impact in practices ranging from management consulting to 
political polling and market  surveying to nongovernmental organizations and development 
agencies of all stripes.
 There is reason, then, to view the university  itself as a space ripe for recolonization and 
experimentation at the hands of “social scientists” whose techniques originate both inside and 
outside established disciplines. As early as 1945, James Conant, president of Harvard, 
campaigned for an elite liberal arts curriculum but arguably had more success in applying 
intelligence testing—in the form of the SAT—to the meritocratic selection of undergraduates. 
Widespread adoption of management science techniques, abetted by computerization, marked 
the administration of Clark Kerr, president of the University of California System in the 1960s. 
No sooner had Kerr, a labor relations expert, proclaimed the virtues of the scientifically 
administered “multiversity” than Berkeley  students donned IBM punchcards pleading “please 
don’t bend, fold, spindle, or mutilate me” and soon commenced rioting.
The corporate-managerial sloganeering of the 1980s, and with it  the insinuation of the 
quantitative metrics of Excellence feared by Readings, are simply the latest stages of a long fitful 
struggle in which the laboratory remakes the university. Even more recently, the proliferation of 
semi-autonomous university research centers, technology transfer offices, and fundraising and 
outreach opportunities capitalizing on marketable scientific achievements emanating from 
university labs all speak to a realignment of interests and personnel bringing laboratory scientists 
into closer contact with university administrators and venture capitalists while at the same time 
distancing them from their humanistic brethren under the traditional rubric of “arts and 
sciences.”
 To recognize the laboratory’s institutional ascendancy as a secular trend is in no way to 
prophesy that scientists in white coats and safety goggles will next invade our classrooms, or that 
philosophers, historians, and literary critics will be required to adopt quantitative methods, 
perform experiments, and test falsifiable hypotheses. It means instead that the laboratory’s 
values, practices, metaphors, and rhetoric will prove best suited to reconfiguring our institutions 
around emergent changes in social needs, political demands, and the collective cultural 
imagination.
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 Amidst such changes, the nation-state which legitimates and often directly funds the 
university has shown little signs of disappearing in the age of globalization. Instead the nation-
state, and the citizenry whose will it  embodies, have only ratcheted up their demands of the 
university, demanding an update of its ideology  in the process. Today, the laboratory’s core 
values, of experimentalism, social engagement, and entrepreneurship are more congenial to the 
demands of state and citizen than the appeals to high culture and individuation peddled by the 
likes of Humboldt and Matthew Arnold, and far more suited to girding national citizenries to 
undertake the challenges of economic competition on a globalized playing field. Here I need 
only quote Obama’s address to Congress in February: “In a global economy, where the most 
valuable skill you can sell is your knowledge, a good education is no longer just a pathway  to 
opportunity. It  is a pre-requisite… because we know the countries that out-teach us today will 
out-compete us tomorrow.”
 
Any ideology that abstracts from the tangible achievements of laboratory science to a set 
of core laboratory  values applicable to political and institutional reform risks misapplying 
examples drawn from daily  practice and overgeneralizing in the name of a particular agenda. 
Certainly  this danger attends those, including perhaps myself, who style the laboratory as a 
hegemonic, all-pervading institution in willful defiance of postmodernism’s insistence on, and 
celebration of, pluralism, rupture, and contestation. The uncritical valorization of natural science, 
not to mention the large-scale social engineering also associated in my view with the laboratory, 
is too obviously  problematic to need much discussion. Particularly the strain of postmodernism 
associated with Foucault has already done much to historicize and criticize the growth of this 
knowledge/power complex.
Even better, however, humanists would do well to embrace rather than to combat the 
laboratory’s remaking of the shell that is the university. Ironically, the adoption of its values—
experimentalism, engagement, entrepreneurship—may serve to arrest the crippling disciplinary 
subspecialization that has finally rendered humanists unable to appeal credibly to the shopworn 
notion that we educate well-rounded citizens and in some quarters has even painted us as 
hypocrites.
 Interdisciplinary programs of the sort  associated with Cultural Studies represent an early 
but somewhat ineffectual rejoinder to such critics because such programs replicate the structures 
of the disciplines in the very attempt to challenge them for intellectual turf. Legitimacy is only 
achieved in our world by  founding departments and starting journals, attending conferences and 
conducting peer review. Those humanists who are the true legatees of Humboldt’s well-rounded 
ideal of Bildung, not to mention its antecedents in the Renaissance and among the ancients, 
might instead adopt a more radical stance. Here is where Lyotard provides some tantalizing 
suggestions.
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V. Lyotard
 Lyotard may be most commonly associated with his definition of postmodernism but it is 
well to remember that he begins The Postmodern Condition discussing the sciences of language, 
the computerization of knowledge, the possibility of machine translation, and the likelihood that 
massive “memory banks” may someday make information accessible to all through “intelligent 
terminals.” This was in 1979, by the way, a few years before the great French “Minitel” 
experiment. Lyotard’s essay culminates in a plea for a new pedagogy centered on “telematics,” 
“informatics,” and “didactics”—one can easily  imagine this sounds better in French—all 
centered in some way on training in computers, languages, mathematics, and logic. Education 
should aim to provide “operational skills” fulfilling society’s needs rather than inculcating the 
“ideals” of traditional humanism. Even such mundane subjects as job retraining and continuing 
education, perhaps vestigial remnants of the original Quebec government policy report, inspire a 
vision whereby  students “acquire information, languages, and language games allowing them 
both to widen their occupational horizons and articulate their technical and ethical experience.”
 Connecting independent data sets through leaps of computer-guided imagination, citizens 
of tomorrow will casually  violate disciplinary boundaries, engage in interdisciplinary  teamwork, 
and accrue social power through verbal performances showcasing an ability to link heretofore 
disparate fields of knowledge. Lyotard repeatedly invokes Wittgenstein’s notion of “language 
games” to describe a situation in which transactions over knowledge can no longer appeal to the 
transcendental ethical validation that metanarratives once provided. What he calls “language 
games of perfect information” arise when computers make information universally accessible 
and enable seekers of knowledge to engage each other on a level playing field. Here Lyotard 
slips conceptually from Wittgenstein’s “language games” to the “games of perfect information” 
derived from the game-theoretical economics pioneered by Wittgenstein’s fellow Austro-
Hungarian John von Neumann. But unlike well-informed shopping expeditions on Amazon.com, 
language games require participants to command prior facility  in language as a precondition to 
being able to play games effectively. Herein lies a new task for our systems of education: to train 
up citizens to overcome the degradation of literacy and simple articulate speech in the age of 
Twitter.
 And here I come to my own conclusion, a gloss on Lyotard swapping out “game” for 
“experiment.” What we have witnessed in the years since the peak of postmodernism is a 
colossal consensual social experiment called cyberspace, the hybrid space of physical technology 
and virtual communication spawned in the Cold War laboratory, that for all of its hyping as a 
revolutionary  departure merely represents the latest manifestation of the laboratory’s ongoing 
supremacy.
Knowledge, in this world, is the opposite of information, that which cannot be 
disembodied and sent  as a message, but that  which must be practiced to be learned. The recent 
information revolution doesn’t betoken the emergence of a new institution of knowledge so 
much as reveal the stakes for education as the laboratory  reinvents the disciplines: the critical 
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need to acquire interpretive, imaginative, and performative skills to process information when 
information is available to all and its mere possession is meaningless. Interpretation, 
imagination, and performance, on this view, function as the humanistic mirror image of, the 
complement to, laboratory experiment, engagement, and entrepreneurship.
 Disciplinary scholarship used to consist in indoctrinating the student into a privileged 
canon of texts as a prerequisite and accompaniment to the teaching of the interpretive, 
imaginative, and performative skills needed to derive meaning from them. Discipline in the sense 
of behavioral conditioning, the mastery of difficult skills, was yoked to discipline in the sense of 
specialization, the refinement of those skills around particular subject  matters enshrined as 
intrinsically valuable by the metanarratives of individual fields, whether the rise and fall of 
nations in history, the quest  for the subconscious in psychology, or the Grand Unified Theory in 
physics. The discrediting of metanarratives and the computerization of texts in no way threaten 
the underlying skills the disciplines impart, only the divisions of turf that give each one its own 
subject matter—its textual canons and foundational monographs, endlessly  extended by further 
scholarly publications, journals, and conferences.
 In sum, both the university and its liberal-humanist ideology will survive but in 
reinvented form, following a postdisciplinary  ideology that increasingly  dispenses with 
specialization for the sake of pure curiosity  in favor of a pedagogy of skills that train students to 
understand the laboratory  in all its manifestations and to reflect ethically on its impact on society. 
What the humanities will likely be forced to do is reconfigure an ancient tradition of values 
inquiry  yet again, not around the model of disciplinary specialization (we’ve already seen how 
unnatural that is) but around the criticism and assessment of the social experiments that both the 
natural and the social sciences bring about. Paradoxically, it  is by appealing to innate curiosity 
and timeless human ethical, aesthetic, and political concerns that we can best motivate our 
students to acquire the difficult practical skills needed for economic competitiveness and global 
citizenship.
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